Federalist No. 7

IT IS sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other? It would be a full answer to this question to say — precisely the same inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the nations in the world. But, unfortunately for us, the question admits of a more particular answer. There are causes of differences within our immediate contemplation, of the tendency of which, even under the restraints of a federal constitution, we have had sufficient experience to enable us to form a judgment of what might be expected if those restraints were removed. Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations. Perhaps the greatest proportion of wars that have desolated the earth have sprung from this origin. This cause would exist among us in full force. We have a vast tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States.[1]

Hamilton forged ahead, detailing some of the differences currently unsettled where the new nation was concerned. In fact, certain claims of property were still being made by England. Evidently the end of the war had not resolved every territorial issue, and certain states were claiming land that England had not yet relinquished. Dismembering the union would only serve to exacerbate the situation.

Beyond current territorial questions, large swaths of land in the West were yet unclaimed and were currently viewed as property of the union in general. That issue alone would prove sufficient to bring conflict between assorted parties seeking to claim ownership.

Hamilton then began to pinpoint for his audience, as well as his philosophical adversaries, specific circumstances that served to support his claim. As an example, there was evidently a dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania concerning the Wyoming territory. Admittedly, it seems strange that two east coast states would argue over Wyoming. The courts evidently found in favor of Pennsylvania and Connecticut made it clear that they were extremely dissatisfied with the decision, indicating that it was an injustice and that Connecticut had been injured by the ruling. According to Hamilton, without a united country, such a dispute might easily lead to armed confrontation.

At present, a large part of the vacant Western territory is, by cession at least, if not by any anterior right, the common property of the Union. If that were at an end, the States which made the cession, on a principle of federal compromise, would be apt when the motive of the grant had ceased, to reclaim the lands as a reversion. The other States would no doubt insist on a proportion, by right of representation. Their argument would be, that a grant, once made, could not be revoked; and that the justice of participating in territory acquired or secured by the joint efforts of the Confederacy, remained undiminished. If, contrary to probability, it should be admitted by all the States, that each had a right to a share of this common stock, there would still be a difficulty to be surmounted, as to a proper rule of apportionment. Different principles would be set up by different States for this purpose; and as they would affect the opposite interests of the parties, they might not easily be susceptible of a pacific adjustment. In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we perceive an ample theatre for hostile pretensions, without any umpire or common judge to interpose between the contending parties. To reason from the past to the future, we shall have good ground to apprehend, that the sword would sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter of their differences.[2]

Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of the transactions which attended the progress of the controversy between this State and the district of Vermont, can vouch the opposition we experienced, as well from States not interested as from those which were interested in the claim; and can attest the danger to which the peace of the Confederacy might have been exposed, had this State attempted to assert its rights by force. Two motives preponderated in that opposition: one, a jealousy entertained of our future power; and the other, the interest of certain individuals of influence in the neighboring States, who had obtained grants of lands under the actual government of that district. Even the States which brought forward claims, in contradiction to ours, seemed more solicitous to dismember this State, than to establish their own pretensions. These were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. New Jersey and Rhode Island, upon all occasions, discovered a warm zeal for the independence of Vermont; and Maryland, still alarmed by the appearance of a connection between Canada and that State, entered deeply into the same views. These being small States, saw with an unfriendly eye the perspective of our growing greatness.[4]

The circumstances of the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, respecting the land at Wyoming, admonish us not to be sanguine in expecting an easy accommodation of such differences. The articles of confederation obliged the parties to submit the matter to the decision of a federal court. The submission was made, and the court decided in favor of Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave strong indications of dissatisfaction with that determination; nor did she appear to be entirely resigned to it, till, by negotiation and management, something like an equivalent was found for the loss she supposed herself to have sustained. Nothing here said is intended to convey the slightest censure on the conduct of that State. She no doubt sincerely believed herself to have been injured by the decision; and States, like individuals, acquiesce with great reluctance in determinations to their disadvantage.[3]

Vermont was not among the original thirteen colonies. Instead, it was an independent republic. However, both New York and New Hampshire attempted to lay claim to the territory. In fact, this dispute was in process during the writing of the Federalist Papers. It was a situation where various states involved themselves since certain other states had received land grants in the territory. This was a perfect example of the kind of territorial disputes that were so dangerous. The quarrel would later be settled in 1791 as Vermont was admitted to the union as a state member of the United States. Still, at the time the controversy was ripe for Hamilton’s pen.

According to Hamilton, territorial disputes might not be the only matter through which envies and jealousies might develop. Economic disparities – what Hamilton called “competitions of commerce” – might also be a source of conflict.

In a review of these transactions we may trace some of the causes which would be likely to embroil the States with each other, if it should be their unpropitious destiny to become disunited. The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention. The States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbors. Each State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar to itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would beget discontent.

The habits of intercourse, on the basis of equal privileges, to which we have been accustomed since the earliest settlement of the country, would give a keener edge to those causes of discontent than they would naturally have independent of this circumstance. We should be ready to denominate injuries those things which were in reality the justifiable acts of independent sovereignties consulting a distinct interest. The spirit of enterprise, which characterizes the commercial part of America, has left no occasion of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all probable that this unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of trade by which particular States might endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens. The infractions of these regulations, on one side, the efforts to prevent and repel them, on the other, would naturally lead to outrages, and these to reprisals and wars.[5]

The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision between the separate States or confederacies. The apportionment, in the first instance, and the progressive extinguishment afterward, would be alike productive of ill-humor and animosity. How would it be possible to agree upon a rule of apportionment satisfactory to all? There is scarcely any that can be proposed which is entirely free from real objections. These, as usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse interest of the parties. There are even dissimilar views among the States as to the general principle of discharging the public debt. Some of them, either less impressed with the importance of national credit, or because their citizens have little, if any, immediate interest in the question, feel an indifference, if not a repugnance, to the payment of the domestic debt at any rate. These would be inclined to magnify the difficulties of a distribution. Others of them, a numerous body of whose citizens are creditors to the public beyond proportion of the State in the total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous for some equitable and effective provision.[6]

An additional matter that would undoubtedly invite contention would be the payment of federal debt. During the Revolutionary War the federal government, under the authority of the Articles of Confederation, went into debt with other nations to pay for the war. In a fractured land, exactly who would be responsible to repay the debt? While it may be granted that this issue would be short-term, it would weigh more heavily as a divisive factor than many might think. Additionally, it might not end up being a particularly short-term item after all.

According to Hamilton, even if the states were to confirm an equitable agreement where the debt was concerned, that would certainly not be the end of the matter. Eventually the states would view the debt as a responsibility not their own. The war was past and they would gain no additional benefit parting with money to pay for something that was simply a part of history.

Insights - Federalist No. 7 - Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (continued) and Particular Causes Enumerated Written by Alexander Hamilton Independent Journal, November 15, 1787

The back-and-forth between the Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers focused on 1) reasons to ratify the proposed constitution and 2) reasons to reject the proposed constitution. One of the primary reasons offered in favor of ratification in the Federalist Papers is concern that the various states, unless united under a single central government, might eventually become independent countries in conflict with one another. Anti-Federalists have countered with their arguments, one of which is the question: What issues would bring conflict between the states? Here Hamilton addresses the question bluntly, writing that they would undoubtedly fight over the same issues that have caused war between countries historically, not the least of which would be disputes over property.

Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule surmounted, and the apportionment made. Still there is great room to suppose that the rule agreed upon would, upon experiment, be found to bear harder upon some States than upon others. Those which were sufferers by it would naturally seek for a mitigation of the burden. The others would as naturally be disinclined to a revision, which was likely to end in an increase of their own incumbrances. Their refusal would be too plausible a pretext to the complaining States to withhold their contributions, not to be embraced with avidity; and the non-compliance of these States with their engagements would be a ground of bitter discussion and altercation. If even the rule adopted should in practice justify the equality of its principle, still delinquencies in payments on the part of some of the States would result from a diversity of other causes — the real deficiency of resources; the mismanagement of their finances; accidental disorders in the management of the government; and, in addition to the rest, the reluctance with which men commonly part with money for purposes that have outlived the exigencies which produced them, and interfere with the supply of immediate wants. Delinquencies, from whatever causes, would be productive of complaints, recriminations, and quarrels. There is, perhaps, nothing more likely to disturb the tranquillity of nations than their being bound to mutual contributions for any common object that does not yield an equal and coincident benefit. For it is an observation, as true as it is trite, that there is nothing men differ so readily about as the payment of money.[7]

Finally, the argument is raised that unless the states were bonded together as a single nation under one central government, the individual states would become pawns slapped about by other nations. They would undoubtedly be leveraged against one another as other nations sought to take economic and other advantages. Such contracts and alliances would eventually serve as the undoing of America.

The probability of incompatible alliances between the different States or confederacies and different foreign nations, and the effects of this situation upon the peace of the whole, have been sufficiently unfolded in some preceding papers. From the view they have exhibited of this part of the subject, this conclusion is to be drawn, that America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive, would, by the operation of such jarring alliances, be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions of the parts into which she was divided, would be likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers equally the enemies of them all.[8]

________________________

[1] Federalist No. 7

[2] Ibid

[3] Ibid

[4] Ibid

[5] Ibid

[6] Ibid

[7] Ibid

[8] Ibid

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