Federalist No. 8

As noble as it might seem to believe all states would live together in blissful harmony, it was impracticable. Indeed, it would undoubtedly be that nobility that could easily lead a state down the very path it sought to avoid. Friendships across state boundaries would soon give way to prioritizing state identity. Eventually, without a source of dependable protection, the citizens of the state would begin to dwell in a state of fear of battle. That state of fear would ultimately lead them to rely on institutions even more stringent than the constitution afforded – institutions under whose leadership their freedoms might well disappear.

These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or speculative defects in a Constitution, the whole power of which is lodged in the hands of a people, or their representatives and delegates, but they are solid conclusions, drawn from the natural and necessary progress of human affairs.[5]

Certain states would undoubtedly balk at the idea of developing their own military. However, in Europe the presence of standing armies has proven impactful. Not only have armies effectively deterred violence, but the character of war had changed in Europe. Having a standing army tended to level the playing field for smaller nations. Rather than massive conflicts, battles were generally limited to skirmishes. However, absent a strong central government in America those states with fewer resources would leave themselves vulnerable to the wants and jealousies of larger, more resourceful states. Drawing a comparison between Europe and a potentially divided America, according to Hamilton:

Ratification of the constitution, according to Hamilton, would help the states avoid the calamities and bitterness of conflict. For one thing, the states would no longer be separate, bordering other nations with whom relations could sour. European and other nations were, he believed, too distant to provide a threat against a united front in America. Indeed, the Revolutionary War had shown how ineffective England had been, trying to fight a war across the ocean. However, as separate entities, the states may well be vulnerable to foreign adversaries.

As much as citizens might oppose a standing army, its existence would be inevitable. Armies would develop either at the federal or state level – with or without the proposed constitution. Without the founding constitution to prevent it, some state would eventually succumb to the very monarch they despised under King George III.

If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity will be likely to continue too much disproportioned in strength to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security. But if we should be disunited, and the integral parts should either remain separated, or, which is most probable, should be thrown together into two or three confederacies, we should be, in a short course of time, in the predicament of the continental powers of Europe — our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other.[7]

Their existence, however, from the very terms of the proposition, is, at most, problematical and uncertain. But standing armies, it may be replied, must inevitably result from a dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent war and constant apprehension, which require a state of as constant preparation, will infallibly produce them. The weaker States or confederacies would first have recourse to them, to put themselves upon an equality with their more potent neighbors. They would endeavor to supply the inferiority of population and resources by a more regular and effective system of defense, by disciplined troops, and by fortifications. They would, at the same time, be necessitated to strengthen the executive arm of government, in doing which their constitutions would acquire a progressive direction toward monarchy. Thus, we should, in a little time, see established in every part of this country the same engines of despotism which have been the scourge of the Old World.[4]

…The means of revenue, which have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold and silver and of the arts of industry, and the science of finance, which is the offspring of modern times, concurring with the habits of nations, have produced an entire revolution in the system of war, and have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the citizens, the inseparable companions of frequent hostility.[6]

Insights – Federalist No. 8 - Consequences of Hostilities Between the States Written by Alexander Hamilton New York Packet, November 20, 1787

One issue of dissention among those who wished to reject the constitution was the likelihood of a standing army that would undoubtedly be developed were a central government to utilize the authority granted under the constitution. That issue is addressed here. However, that is not quite where the paper begins.

In this, Federalist No. 8, Alexander Hamilton begins by focusing on the kinds of conflicts the disunited states could anticipate. He explains that they would be subject to the same interactions, good and bad, that have befallen other neighboring nations who were not united under a single central government. Specifically, he directs the colonists’ attention to Europe where nations have long-maintained standing armies. Unfortunately, the individual states would not have the benefit of armies to serve as protectors or deterrents should squabbles with other states arise.

The history of war, in that quarter of the globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide nothing; of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort and little acquisition. In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy of military establishments would postpone them as long as possible. The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open to another, would facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be desultory and predatory.[2]

The violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free. The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING ARMIES and the correspondent appendages of military establishments. Standing armies, it is said, are not provided against in the new Constitution; and it is therefore inferred that they may exist under it.[3]

ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy, would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of friendship and enmity, with each other, which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations not united under one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some of the consequences that would attend such a situation. War between the States, in the first period of their separate existence, would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries where regular military establishments have long obtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their introduction.[1]

Was Hamilton overstating the dangers of forging ahead without ratifying the constitution? Many believed he was. That was certainly true of the authors of the Anti-Federalist Papers. In response, Hamilton had this to say.

Speculating on a question concerning the ancient republics of Greece, Hamilton presumed queries about how those states had avoided the very internal conflicts about which Hamilton was voicing concerns. His answer was simple. Those were nations of soldiers. Consequently, their situation could not be compared to an industrious nation where commerce, invention, and productivity were the mainstays. Unlike the Grecian republics, in modern times, disciplined armies were far more distinct – segregated from the balance of the population.

Hamilton warned the people that they should strongly consider his advice concerning ratification. His insights were to be taken seriously. Indeed, he was confident that, were they to give his words the weight they deserved, they would see the wisdom he purveyed.

This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty. It deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every prudent and honest man of whatever party. If such men will make a firm and solemn pause, and meditate dispassionately on the importance of this interesting idea; if they will contemplate it in all its attitudes, and trace it to all its consequences, they will not hesitate to part with trivial objections to a Constitution, the rejection of which would in all probability put a final period to the Union. The airy phantoms that flit before the distempered imaginations of some of its adversaries would quickly give place to the more substantial forms of dangers, real, certain, and formidable.[8]

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[1] Federalist No. 8

[2] Ibid

[3] Ibid

[4] Ibid

[5] Ibid

[6] Ibid

[7] Ibid

[8] Ibid

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